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Abstract
Settlers flocking to “boomtowns” on the American western frontier were faced with
the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face: self-governance.
Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their e cacy de-
pends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. Peripheral
network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent
cheating obtains in equilibrium. Groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that
face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet into less-
cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore,
population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements
can undermine cooperation. These insights help explain the trajectory of cooperation
in mining towns in the “wild west” in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated
as the population surged, and help make sense of why only certain non-white settlers
were targets of hostility and racism.
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1 Introduction
Informal institutions– uno cial, socially-shared rules– are ubiquitous. While they play
an important role in well-functioning states enforcing extra-legal norms and mediating
the e↵ects of formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004), the stakes are highest
when formal institutions are ine↵ective or absent. In weak or failed states, informal
institutions can be the primary check on behavior; the e cacy of these institutions
determines whether whole groups of individuals will coexist in peace and productivity
or in conflict and ine ciency (Dixit, 2004).
A large body of empirical work has documented that informal rules can enforce good
behavior in both weak and strong states, with applications ranging from 11th-century
Maghrebi traders (Greif, 1993) to modern-day resource sharers (Ostrom, 1990) to eth-
nically homogeneous African villagers (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and theoretical
work has demonstrated that arrangements threatening peer sanction for misbehavior
can support cooperation under a range of conditions.
Existing theory provides the conditions under which peer sanction enforces coop-
eration perfectly– in equilibrium, no one misbehaves. Realistically, though, success
stories are those in which cooperation is the norm, but some misbehavior occurs now
and then. There were very few, but not 0, cases of Maghrebi traders cheating (Greif,
1993, footnote 8 p. 598); contributions to public goods in ethnically homogeneous vil-
lages are high, but some still under contribute (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005, p. 2327); in
the case discussed below, relations among settlers in mining towns were mostly civil,
except for a few exceptions, which turned into many systematic exceptions. To explain
persistent misbehavior, to identify the perpetrators and targets of misbehavior, and to
understand the trajectory of cooperation breakdown, we need richer theory.
This paper establishes one source of persistent misbehavior in informal institutions:
social network position. If gossip about behavior spreads through a social network,
one’s position within a network determines how many others hear the news quickly,
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which determines how many others could act on the news and punish when neces-
sary. Peripheral network positions– those from which news does not reach many others
quickly– generate incentives to misbehave, sometimes to such an extent that the most
cooperative equilibrium that can be enforced by peer sanctions entails perpetual de-
fections by and against those in peripheral positions. Furthermore, shocks that make
cooperation more di cult, like a disaster that increases the gains from cheating in
market exchanges, or the exodus of those most central in the network, can result in a
group ratcheting into a less cooperative equilibrium in which the most peripheral cheat
and are cheated against in perpetuity.
After introducing a theory that makes this logic precise and deriving testable hy-
potheses about cooperation breakdown and persistent cheating, the paper presents an
empirical case which o↵ers a unique opportunity to classify perpetrators and victims
of some misbehavior in a weak state context, and to observe the consequences of a
changing environment.
The case is one that has been largely ignored by the informal institutions literature:
mining towns in the American West that grew so rapidly during the 19th century gold
rush that they were dubbed “boomtowns.” Formal governance was largely absent in
these towns, so miners were left to their own devices to coexist with each other and the
nearby native populations. Arguably due to their ability to threaten peer sanctions for
misbehavior, settlers experienced a long period in which peace and cooperation were
the norm. After a few years the norm of peace began to disintegrate, but disintegration
was not uniform. Hostility tended to be targeted at certain groups of settlers and not
others, and be perpetrated against natives by certain settlers and not others.
The model presented here helps make sense of these outcomes by examining incen-
tives determined by social network position. Rapid population growth, high turnover,
and enclave settlement patterns all have consequences for a group’s communication
network, often resulting in especially peripheral positions which strain cooperative ar-
rangements. When cooperation breaks down, the most peripheral become victims of
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misbehavior by in-group members; their best response is to defect in return, which can
usher in a less-cooperative equilibrium in which the peripheral players are e↵ectively os-
tracized. Indeed, Chinese immigrants to boomtowns, who uniquely settled in enclaves
with limited network reach, experienced a pattern of interactions consistent with this
story: initial cooperation, then some breakdown, followed by wholesale hostility and
ostracism.
This paper thus makes three contributions to the study of informal governance.
First, it advances theory which makes the role of networks that spread information
explicit and characterizes partially-cooperative equilibria in terms of heterogeneity in
network position. Not only does the theory highlight sources of cooperation failure
masked by non-network models, but it also identifies a source of persistent misbe-
havior that is not a result of accidents, errors, or irrationality. Second, the theory is
unusual in its consideration of responses to shocks and transitions between equilibria.
Groups engaged in informal governance, especially in weak state contexts, are partic-
ularly exposed to demographic and environmental changes like immigration flows and
natural disasters. This paper characterizes when these changes should be expected to
a↵ect cooperative arrangements, who is likely to be most a↵ected, and the equilibria
that emerge as a result. Third, this paper explores an understudied case of informal
governance. The theoretical claims advanced here are consistent with the history of
19th century boomtowns, and also o↵er an explanation for the otherwise puzzling phe-
nomenon that the breakdown of cooperation appears to have systematically targeted
some and not others.
2 Informal Governance in Weak States
There are many informal arrangements that can in principle enforce cooperative be-
havior. This paper joins the line of research focused on enforcement via peer sanction.1
1This type of enforcement scheme is prized for its realism. It is consistent with laboratory
experiments finding that third parties punish (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004); it is thought to be
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Members of a community respond to behavior deemed inappropriate by issuing sanc-
tions, and the threat of this response can, under the right conditions, dissuade everyone
from misbehaving in the first place.
Theoretical work on social sanctions has demonstrated the existence and properties
of fully cooperative equilibria in environments bounded by two extremes: one in which
everyone learns about everyone else’s behavior immediately (Kandori, 1992; Fearon
and Laitin, 1996; Dal Bo´, 2007), the other in which no one learns anything other than
their own play (Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994; Harrington, 1995).
The information environment in real groups, especially those engaged in self-governance,
is likely somewhere in between. Information about others’ behavior tends to be news-
worthy, and individuals who hear it tend to share it with others. This kind of social
information, often labeled gossip, spreads from person to person through a social net-
work, a fact used in many models that rely on social sanctioning by peers to enforce
good behavior (Kandori, 1992; Greif, 1993; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Lippert and Spag-
nolo, 2011; Larson, 2016). When someone misbehaves, others hear about it from their
social contacts, who spread the news to their social contacts, and so on. Knowledge of
misbehavior allows others to punish it, and the threat of this punishment can incen-
tivize cooperation.
Much theory has been devoted to generalizing folk theorems and characterizing
broad results for cooperation when actors are connected in networks (Renault and
Tomala, 1998; Cho, 2011; Ali and Miller, 2013; Laclau, 2014; Nava and Piccione, 2014;
Ali and Miller, 2016). This paper takes a narrower approach and considers a specific
set of equilibria in order to generate hypotheses about an empirical case. Specifically,
I consider a set of equilibria in which players use messages passed via word-of-mouth
communication to implement an in-group policing strategy. In contrast to public goods
at play in settings that range from the Ottoman Empire (Fearon and Laitin, 1996) to present-
day villages in Uganda (Habyarimana et al., 2009, p. 172); and evidence presented below suggests
settlers in boomtowns used peer sanctioning schemes, making this the appropriate setup for deriving
useful hypotheses.
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games on networks (Pecorino, 1999; Haag and Laguno↵, 2007; Wolitzky, 2013; Bal-
maceda and Escobar, 2014), the action set here is binary (as in Ali and Miller, 2013;
Nava and Piccione, 2014) so that to cooperate is to refrain from doing something bad
(like jumping a claim or violating an informal land-use treaty). Players interact in a
setting with word-of-mouth communication (as in Lippert and Spagnolo, 2011) and so
use gossip about misbehavior to determine whether someone is in bad standing and
worthy of punishment.2
The results I find are similar in character to a broad set of results finding that
having too few links in networks can be problematic (see, e.g., Balmaceda and Escobar,
2014; Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan, 2012; Lippert and Spagnolo, 2011; Ali
and Miller, 2013). The present paper characterizes a set of equilibria in which some,
possibly all, play a network version of in-group policing (as in Larson, 2016) and some
opt out and perpetually defect. I show that for a given set of parameter values, the
maximum feasible size of the group of in-group policers (and hence cooperators in
equilibrium) is a function of the most peripheral network positions. The presence of
highly peripheral positions can preclude equilibria in which everyone cooperates, but
still allow equilibria in which some, even most cooperate. Moreover, transitions to
equilibria with fewer cooperators occur naturally in response to shocks, creating a
ratchet e↵ect in which after a shock, fewer cooperate and some engage in perpetual
defection.
This setup generates a set of testable hypotheses which, I argue, are relevant to
a uniquely well-documented instance of self-governance in a weak state setting: the
historical record contains more than usual micro-level information on cooperation and
conflict and some indirect evidence of network structure in the boomtowns of the “wild
west.” Settlers were tasked with policing behavior in their own communities and in
2This is in contrast to the standard approach of enforcing cooperation on networks via contagion
strategies in which players “learn” information through the network by being defected on in the
event that punishment is underway Kandori (1992); Ellison (1994); Wolitzky (2013); Acemoglu and
Wolitzky (2015).
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interactions between settlers and neighboring Native Americans. While these towns
were remarkably peaceful and secure in the early years of the gold rush, cooperation
deteriorated as the population surged and social structures changed. The model here
helps make sense of why cooperation flagged, which community members were the
perpetrators, and why some uncooperative behavior was persistent.
3 A Model of Settler- Native Interactions
3.1 Preview of the Boomtown Context
The model captures a setting in which individuals interact at random, and each in-
teraction presents an opportunity to impose costs on someone else for one’s own gain
if one could get away with it. In the context of a boomtown to which this will be
applied, this opportunity could take many forms: selling faulty products, using falsely-
labeled weights when valuing gold ore, jumping a claim, committing petty theft, and
so on. These opportunities would also be present in interactions with an out-group,
in this case neighboring Native Americans, especially in the form of violating informal
agreements about the use of land.
In the model, information about misbehavior spreads in the form of gossip through
a fixed communication network. Since communications technology was rudimentary
on the frontier, this process can be thought of as in-person, word-of-mouth sharing.3 If
someone is the victim of a jumped claim, that person tells his (and boomtown residents
were overwhelmingly male) network neighbors, who tells his network neighbors, and so
on. All those who hear can then punish the wrongdoer. If enough are expected to hear
quickly, the disincentive to jump the claim in the first place can be mitigated. How
well this works depends in part on the network.
3The other option was spreading news in print; however, even if the town developed a newspaper
and even if the newspaper had a wide circulation, the process of manual typesetting, printing and
delivering was quite slow (Dary, 1998), making word-of-mouth the primary option.
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3.2 Model Setup
Begin with a standard community enforcement setup in which two groups A and B
with sets of players {1, . . . , n} and {n + 1, . . . , 2n}, respectively, randomly encounter
each other and play the prisoner’s dilemma.4 Specifically, define an infinitely repeated
game G in which all players play one round of prisoner’s dilemma with an opponent
independently drawn from the out-group with probability p and from the in-group with
probability 1 p each period.5 Nature reveals to each player only his own pairing. Each
round faces payo↵s:
c d
c
d
0B@ 1, 1   ,↵
↵,   0, 0
1CA
where ↵ > 1,  > 0 and ↵  2 < 1. Players discount future payo↵s with common
discount factor   < 1.
A group is a set of players who can all recognize each other: they can perfectly
identify each other, describe each other, and would recognize each other if rematched.
A group cannot recognize or describe individual out-group members. When matched
with an out-group member, a player only knows he’s playing ‘someone’ from the other
group.6
Define a “communication network” for group A by the pair (gA, A) with n ⇥ n
adjacency matrix gA where gAi,j = g
A
j,i = 1 indicates a link between i 6= j 2 A, and
4This game generalizes Fearon and Laitin (1996) to include a communication network that
spreads relevant information about play.
5The groups are assumed to be the same size to keep matching notation simple and avoid having
to specify pairs of matching probabilities that are functions of the group size.
6This is the hard case for inter-group cooperation, and also describes well the relationship
between groups of settlers (the in-group) and the neighboring Native Americans (the out-group) in
the case discussed below.
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likewise (gB, B) for group B. I will refer to the networks as “gA” and “gB,” or simply
as g when the group identity is unimportant. Links in the networks are undirected
and unweighted, and no links span the two groups. Networks are common knowledge
within but not across groups, consistent with the assumption that individuals know
little about the out-group.
Actions in in-group pairings are unobservable. Actions in out-group pairings are
observable to a subset of others determined by the network.7 The network serves
two roles. One, it determines who observes whose out-group interactions– network
neighbors observe each other in these encounters. Two, it determines who passes
messages (spreads gossip) to whom.
Players learn about other in-group rounds via a gossip process by which the victims
of misbehavior (determined by the strategies below) send a message containing the
identity of the o↵ender and the time of the o↵ense to all network neighbors. These
messages are spread through the network truthfully and deterministically at a rate
r = Degrees SpreadRounds P layed .
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The order of play in the game G is as follows: in each round, nature pairs players at
7As will be described below, individuals learn information about others’ rounds via messages
sent by victims of misbehavior. By assumptions on the networks, no message sent by an out-
group player reaches an in-group player. Consequently, to enforce out-group cooperation with
in-group policing, out-group interactions must be observable to at least someone in the in-group;
unobservable out-group interactions would all be uncooperative. Since the strategies below require
players to unconditionally cooperate in out-group pairings, observing actions is su cient to diagnose
a defection: any d is misbehavior. This is not the case in in-group interactions, in which d’s can
be compliant with the strategy, as when issued in punishment. The cleanest way to model players
dealing with this ambiguity is to assume they do not observe the actions at all but rely solely on the
content of messages sent by victims. Players could play these same strategies while also observing
in-group interactions, so the assumption of unobservable in-group rounds is not strictly necessary.
Assuming observable out-group interactions and private in-group interactions is consistent with the
context of the case below, in which encounters with Native Americans would be on open lands or
occasionally in public marketplaces (observable) whereas encounters with fellow settlers could be
in more private or intimate areas like homes, remote mines, etc.
8Gossip here is a mechanical process, not part of a strategy. While this is consistent with lab
behavior (Sommerfeld et al., 2007) and the speculated evolutionary function of gossip (Enquist and
Leimar, 1993), the opportunities for gain in this setup through strategic lying are not as prevalent
as might be expected. See the online supplementary material for a discussion.
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random respecting p; then players play one round of prisoner’s dilemma; then observers
of misbehavior in out-group pairings and victims of misbehavior in in-group pairings
send messages, and all messages (both these new messages and previously received
messages) spread through the network r degrees, which concludes the round and the
next round begins.
3.3 Messages and Strategies
Without loss of generality, I will present strategies and messages from the perspective of
group A, making A the in-group and B the out-group. I consider a set of strategy pro-
files which entail some subset of the in-group, COOP ⇢ A, playing a finite-punishment
in-group policing strategy, and the complement of the group, CHEAT ⇢ A, cheating
the out-group (playing d while they play c) and defecting against the rest of the in-
group (playing d while they play d). In-group policing strategies like those considered
here capture enforcement schemes used by real groups well.9
Strategies respond to messages sent through the network at the end of each round.
Messages take the following form: when i deviates from strategy profile  CHEAT in a
round with in-group member j, j sends a message mj,i,t = {i, t} which contains the
identity of the o↵ender and the time of the o↵ense to himself and his neighbors. When
i deviates from strategy profile  CHEAT in a round with an out-group member, i’s
network neighbors likewise send messagesmj,i,t = {i, t} to themselves and their network
neighbors. These messages establish who is in bad standing, and spread through the
network at rate r, defined above. Call Mi,t the set of individuals about whom i has
9Cooperation supported by the strategies played by COOP has other desirable properties as
well, which is perhaps why these strategies seem to be favored by real groups. Carrying out
punishment is renegotiation-proof– punishers gain from punishing. Additionally, finite punishments
are desirable in environments prone to errors or mistakes since they destroy minimal value o↵ the
equilibrium path and give groups the chance to return to the e cient outcome, which may have
been particularly important in frontier life where drunken mishaps were common (McGrath, 1987,
p. 75). Most importantly for the account here, they also resemble punishments that settlers opted
to use to enforce communal norms. Accounts of misbehavior cite fines and other concessions that
the o↵enders were pressured to pay for a finite period of time.
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received messages by the start of time t about rounds that have occurred since t  T .
This is the set of individuals that i knows to be in bad standing at that time.
Now consider the generic strategy profile in which the players participating in in-
group policing condition punishment on these messages:
Definition 1 (Network In-Group Policing with Cheaters  CHEAT ). For all
players i 2 COOP :
Play c when matched with an out-group player. When matched with an in-group player
j 2 COOP : play c in the first round. In round t, if i /2 Mj,t (opponent j has received
no message that i is in bad standing), play c if j /2 Mi,t (i has not received a message
that j is in bad standing) and d if j 2 Mi,t (i has received a message that j is in bad
standing). In round t, if i 2 Mj,t (opponent j has received a message that i is in bad
standing), play c if j /2 Mi,t and d if j 2 Mi,t.When matched with an in-group player
j 2 CHEAT , play d.
For all players i 2 CHEAT : Always play d.
Strategies played by those in COOP are responsive to deviations by others in
COOP ; punishment here takes the form of capitulation for a finite number of rounds
T so that a defector concedes value to his punishers for the T rounds that follow his
defection. Player i knows his set of messages Mi,t, and can infer his opponent j’s
messages about i– whether or not i 2 Mj,t– because i knows when he i has deviated,
and he knows the network structure and rate of transmission r.10
An important classification for the analysis that follows will be the extent to which
a player is peripheral, which is a function of his network position. First, consider a
generalized definition of network neighborhood which includes neighbors more than
one degree away:
10It turns out players can play a variant of these strategies without knowing whether their
opponent has received a message about themselves or not. Players know when they have themselves
done something wrong, and so know when messages would be sent. Even if they cannot identify who
has received them, so long as they play “always play c for the T rounds after I defect,” cooperation
can still be enforced.
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Figure 1: Extent to which players are peripheral in a simple example when r = 1, T = 1.
Here #N121 = 1, #N
1
20 = 2, #N
1
2 . . .#N
1
19 = 18, and #N
1
1 = 19.
Definition 2 (k-neighborhood). Let `(i, j) be the length of the shortest path from i
to j. Player i’s k-neighborhood in network gA, Nki (g
A) is the set of all j such that
the shortest path from i to j is less than or equal to k. That is,
Nki (g
A) = {j 2 A : `(i, j)  k, i 6= j}.
Player i’s k-neighborhood is the set of all other players reachable from i in paths of
length k (geodesic distance k). When the network is clear, I will suppress dependence
on g and simply write Nki . Now we can be precise in classifying players as more or less
peripheral:
Definition 3 (Peripheral Players). Player i is more peripheral than player j in
network gA if i’s rT -neighborhood is smaller than j’s; that is, if
#N rTi (g
A) < #N rTj (g
A).
Figure 1 denotes the extent to which each player is peripheral in an example network
for r = 1, T = 1. The lighter the shade, the more peripheral the node.
Now we can consider partial cooperation in equilibrium.
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4 Enforcing Partial Cooperation
4.1 Cheating in Equilibrium
Ultimately, the goal is to characterize partial cooperation in equilibrium, identify when
groups are only able to enforce less-than-full cooperation in equilibrium, and charac-
terize transitions between equilibria and responses to shocks.
In strategy profile  CHEAT , a (possibly empty) subset of the in-group CHEAT ⇢ A
plays a strategy in which they always defect in in- and out-group pairings, and a
(possibly empty) subset COOP ⇢ A cooperates in out-group pairings, plays an in-
group policing strategy with others in COOP , and always defects against those in
CHEAT . First I establish the conditions under which in-group policing among COOP
is su cient to keep all in COOP cooperating in pairings with the out-group and with
others in COOP . The equilibrium outcome entails everyone in CHEAT playing d in
out-group pairings, everyone in COOP playing c in out-group pairings, pairings among
COOP resulting in mutual c and pairings among CHEAT and between CHEAT and
COOP resulting in mutual d.
For  CHEAT to be sequentially rational, it must be that for a division of A into
CHEAT and COOP , no individual has an incentive to deviate from her prescribed
strategy in any history of play. This holds under the following conditions:
Lemma 1 (Partial Cooperation).  CHEAT with partition of A {COOP,CHEAT}
is sequentially rational if and only if, given r, p, T , gA, for all i 2 COOP :
 T   (n  1)(↵  1)
#(N rTi \ COOP )(1  p)(  + 1)
and
 T   (n  1) 
#(N rTi \ COOP )(1  p)(  + 1)
.
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The online supplementary material contains the proof, along with a discussion of
beliefs that extend the behavior to sequential equilibrium.11 The conditions ensure
that those playing the in-group policing strategy can keep each other cooperating,
even when accounting for the fact that those not in COOP do not participate in
punishment. Any equilibrium requires that those who are supposed to in-group police
are not too peripheral among those who are also in-group policing.12
As with any repeated prisoner’s dilemma, an equilibrium with COOP = ; and
CHEAT = A will always exist. In fact, there can exist many partitions of A into
COOP and CHEAT that are sustainable in equilibrium since any subset playing all-d
are always best-responding to each other. Since the present goal is to characterize suc-
cessful self-governance, the interest will be in the most cooperative feasible equilibrium–
the equilibrium with the most individuals comprising the set COOP that is feasible–
which equivalently is the most e cient feasible equilibrium. The most e cient equi-
librium possible is one in which COOP = A and CHEAT = ;, but this is not always
feasible for a given set of parameters. In fact, we can use the conditions in Lemma 1
to specify when full cooperation (COOP = A) is impossible:
Corollary 1 (When Full Cooperation is Impossible). There exists no equilibrium
with COOP = A, CHEAT = ; if, given r, p, T , and gA,
 T < min
i2A
⇢
(n  1)(↵  1)
#NTri (1  p)(  + 1)
 
11As the proof makes clear, the conditions depend only on the final round of the punishment
phase, T , because, although a player expects some amount of punishment in all rounds 1, . . . , T
following a defection, the condition in terms of only T is binding for those contemplating defecting
a second time in a row. When the condition is satisfied for this hard case of defecting, it discourages
all other cases of defection by those in COOP as well.
12The statement N rTi \ COOP is equivalent to N rTi (g|COOP ), that is, the rT -neighborhood in
the subnetwork induced by the set of cooperators COOP . To enforce cooperation among COOP ,
no one can be too peripheral in the network among only those in COOP .
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or
 T < min
i2A
⇢
(n  1) 
#NTri (1  p)(  + 1)
 
.
Since supporting COOP = A can be impossible, what is the most cooperative
feasible equilibrium be for a given set of parameter values? In other words, what is
the largest set of cooperators (or equivalently the smallest set of cheaters) that can be
supported in equilibrium? The following result characterizes the maximally cooperative
feasible equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Maximally Cooperative Equilibrium). An equilibrium with set of
cooperators COOP is the maximally cooperative partial cooperation equilibrium possible
when, given r, p, T , gA,
 T   min
i2COOP
⇢
(n  1)(↵  1)
#(NTri \ COOP )(1  p)(  + 1)
 
(1)
and
 T   min
i2COOP
⇢
(n  1) 
#(NTri \ COOP )(1  p)(  + 1)
 
, (2)
and, for any other set of cooperators COOP 0 such that #COOP 0 > #COOP , either
 T < min
i2COOP 0
⇢
(n  1)(↵  1)
#(NTri \ COOP 0)(1  p)(  + 1)
 
(3)
or
 T < min
i2COOP 0
⇢
(n  1) 
#(NTri \ COOP 0)(1  p)(  + 1)
 
. (4)
Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that the conditions from Lemma 1 hold for the most
tempted individual playing in-group policing among COOP , and conditions (3) and (4)
15
ensure that any candidate addition to the set of those playing in-group policing could
not be incentivized to cooperate among that new set of COOP 0. If all 4 conditions are
satisfied, the equilibrium with partition COOP and CHEAT both entails everyone in
COOP cooperating and is the largest possible set of individuals who could be enticed
to cooperate.
Note that if networks were assumed to be complete (as is often the case, at least
implicitly, in non-networks models), the most cooperative feasible equilibrium would
either entail no one cooperating or everyone cooperating. Intermediate ranges of coop-
eration would not be maximally cooperative since if anyone could be enticed to behave
cooperatively, all could. Maximally cooperative equilibria with intermediate ranges of
cooperation are possible here due to heterogeneity introduced by network position.
The network position determines the gains from potential defections from the in-
group policing strategy: the most peripheral players are the most tempted. Individuals
face punishment for misbehavior from those who receive messages from their victims of
in-group wrongdoing or from witnesses of their out-group wrongdoing. Messages sent
from more peripheral network positions have less reach; fewer others learn quickly. Intu-
itively, then, peripheral network positions generate incentives for individuals in COOP
to misbehave in two ways. First, the most peripheral have the greatest temptation to
defect against the out-group. For them, the number of other in-group members who
hear about the o↵ense from observers is the smallest, yielding the smallest expected
punishment. Second, the most peripheral generate the greatest temptation for in-group
defections. Other in-group members who defect against people in these network po-
sitions in private interactions only need fear punishment from the few other in-group
members who receive the message sent by the victims in these peripheral positions.
Proposition 1 reveals that in a maximally cooperative equilibrium, if any players
cheat, the most peripheral players do:
Corollary 2 (The Cheating Periphery). In a maximally cooperative equilibrium,
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there exists a threshold
x? := min
j2COOP
 
#(NTrj \ COOP )
 
such that
if #NTri < x
?, then i 2 CHEAT.
In other words, there exists a cut below which all players who are at least that
peripheral will be in CHEAT . Note that this cut is su cient– peripheral players will be
the cheaters– but not necessary – others can be too– for inclusion in CHEAT . CHEAT
can also include some players who are central; in fact, there can exist a maximally
cooperative equilibrium in which CHEAT contains a player i who is even more central
in the whole network g than the most central player in COOP . This happens only when
central player i is surrounded by too many others who are too peripheral to belong
to COOP . In this case, though many of them could receive messages sent by i, since
none of them could be enticed to act on the messages, the central position of i does not
help to keep him cooperating. If i were added to the set of COOP , he would be highly
peripheral among the set of cooperators: #(NTri \ COOP ) would be very small. In
other words, highly peripheral players are not only contained in CHEAT themselves,
but can drag more central players into CHEAT as well depending on their placement
throughout the network. The online supplementary material contains an example of
such a case.
One final bit of intuition follows straightforwardly from Proposition 1 and will be
useful when analyzing responses to shocks in the next section. Maximally coopera-
tive equilibria with a larger set of cooperative players (COOP ) are more di cult to
sustain.13
13Equilibrium 1 is more di cult to sustain than equilibrium 2 if, all else equal, equilibrium 2 can
be satisfied for a smaller minimum value of discount factor   than equilibrium 1.
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Corollary 3 (The Di culty of Enforcing High Cooperation). All else equal, a
maximally cooperative equilibrium with #CHEAT cheaters is more di cult to support
than a maximally cooperative equilibrium with #CHEAT 0 > #CHEAT cheaters.
4.2 Shocks to the Gains from Defecting
The results of the last section established that the most e cient equilibria under
 CHEAT are those with as many people as possible playing COOP , and these equi-
libria entail the most peripheral players perpetually defecting. These results also lend
insight into the matters of selecting the equilibrium initially and transitioning out of
equilibrium, perhaps to a new one, in response to shocks.
These conditions are informative for situations in which the conditions for full
cooperation are not satisfied, whether due to natural constraints or to shocks to a
strategic environment in which full cooperation was possible. The next-best equilibria
entail persistent cheating by and against those in peripheral network positions. In-
group policing only works to keep a (possibly large) subset of the in-group cooperating,
and the others perpetually cheat.
In order to derive hypotheses about the consequences of shocks to the parameter
space, a direct comparison of equilibria will be useful. The di↵erence between two
maximally cooperative equilibria, one with #CHEAT cheaters, and one with more,
#CHEAT 0 > #CHEAT cheaters is that the most peripheral among the cooperators
in COOP will be among the cheaters in CHEAT 0.
Corollary 4 (Peripheral Become the Cheaters). In an equilibrium with CHEAT
and COOP , if a new equilibrium with CHEAT 0 and COOP 0 is such that #CHEAT 0 >
#CHEAT , the the most peripheral in the subnetwork induced by COOP (have the
smallest NTr \ COOP ) will be in CHEAT 0.
In the face of a shock that makes cooperation more di cult, the most peripheral
among those cooperating will become cheaters. Just as with Corollary 2, while the most
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peripheral from COOP will definitely become cheaters, some central players in COOP
could also become cheaters if their centrality among COOP depended on connections
to the most peripheral who switch to cheating. Once again, the placement of the
peripheral throughout the network can result in some central players being dragged
into cheating as well.
Because these results can inform responses to shocks, it is important to consider
how equilibrium behavior would be expected to change given a shock, and how and if
a new equilibrium could be coordinated.
In this case, a mechanism by which a group transitions from a more cooperative
to a less cooperative equilibrium is straightforward. Suppose a group is participating
in a fully cooperative equilibrium, when suddenly something about the environment
changes to increase ↵ (in the case presented below, an unusually harsh winter increased
the gains from reneging on an agreement to not forage on lands shared with the out-
group). While an increase to ↵ raises everyone’s temptation to defect, the first for
whom this temptation binds are the most peripheral in the network. Recall that this
temptation manifests itself in two ways. First, it gives the peripheral an extra incentive
to defect on the out-group; expected in-group punishment is no longer su cient to
dissuade them. Second, it increases all other in-group members’ incentive to defect on
the peripheral; expected in-group punishment for doing so is also no longer a su cient
deterrent. Consequently, all in-group members have an incentive to defect against the
most peripheral. Anticipating this new incentive, the peripheral player’s best response
is to always play d to mitigate the consequences. Since no one in the in-group has an
incentive to play a responsive strategy, enticing the peripheral to return to playing c
is impossible and the group becomes locked into mutual defect with the peripheral.
The size of the shock to ↵ determines the size of the peripheral group for whom this
binds.14
14In fact, in resulting equilibrium, those in CHEAT are e↵ectively ostracized. They are forever
denied gains from interactions with the rest of the group. This form of ostracism arises naturally
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Groups can easily ratchet into less cooperative equilibria. Shocks that make coop-
eration more di cult bind first for the peripheral and generate a natural transition to
a pocket of all-d. Interestingly, the same is not true for shocks that make cooperation
easier. If a group is playing a partially cooperative equilibrium and then suddenly
it becomes less profitable to defect (↵ decreases, say), moving to a more cooperative
equilibrium is not as natural and requires an element of trust. Those previous cheaters
who might now have an incentive to cooperate need some assurance that the rest of
the in-group will transition to regarding them as cooperators with whom they play
c by default. Because in-group cooperators would gain by playing d against a newly
cooperative peripheral player who now plays c, transitioning to a more cooperative
equilibrium poses greater di culties.
The results thus far can be formulated into hypotheses pertaining to groups playing
in-group policing in an environment subject to shocks. The first four are straightfor-
ward formulations of Proposition 1 and the related corollaries:
Hypothesis 1: When gains from defection increase, more cheating should obtain in
equilibrium.
Hypothesis 2: When gains from defection increase, the most peripheral should be
among the first to begin cheating.
Hypothesis 3: Transitioning from more to less cooperation should be easier than tran-
sitioning from less to more cooperation.
when full cooperation under in-group policing is impossible, which suggests an endogenous means
by which groups come to ostracize some. Those most tempted to defect cannot be prevented from
doing so; anticipating their defection, in-group opponents steel themselves in these interactions by
defecting as well. This results in a subset that is perpetually defected on by everyone else while the
rest of the group carries on cooperating amongst themselves in the next-best equilibrium outcome.
Ostracism reduces the total sum of payo↵s and so is ine cient, and also reduces the number of
players playing a responsive strategy, so makes enforcing cooperation among those not ostracized
more di cult as well. Groups, then, should prefer to ostracize as few as possible if given the choice.
This downside to ostracizing is the gossip network analog to (Ali and Miller, 2016) in which, when
the network describes who plays whom, there can be a disincentive to implementing long-term
ostracism in any bilateral relationship.
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Hypothesis 4: A reduction in cooperation should manifest itself in a set of in-group
players who are subjected to perpetual mutual defect (they are e↵ectively ostracized).
4.3 Shocks Due to Population Change
While networks among a fixed group of individuals may themselves be reasonably fixed,
groups engaged in self-governance may experience population changes that disrupt the
size of the group as well as the network structure among its members. To generate
expectations about the consequences of these changes, it is important to highlight that
a change in population size– changing n– has ambiguous consequences on incentives for
cooperation. A larger group size can dilute the e cacy of punishment if, for instance,
in a group in which a person expects to be punished by x others for defecting against
the out-group, an increase in group size occurs without an increase in x. Then the
conditional probability of punishment changes from xn 1 to a smaller value
x
n0 1 for
n0 > n. However, a change in the size of the group necessarily means a change in the
composition of the group, which likely has consequences for the network structure and
possibly any individual’s x.
The following corollary helps to make sense of the consequences of changes in n:
Corollary 5 (The Mixed Consequences of Changes in Group Size). Changes
in group size have ambiguous e↵ects on the maximum extent of cooperation in equi-
librium. The direction of change depends on how the network changes as a result of
the change in group composition. For an original group A of size n with network g
and COOP cooperators in a maximally cooperative equilibrium, consider a change in
group size resulting in new group A0 of new size n0 and attendant new network g0. The
change in population strictly decreases (increases) the maximum extent of cooperation
in equilibrium if, for
P ? :=
x?
n  1 = minj2COOP
(
#(NTrj (g) \ COOP )
n  1
)
,
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n0   1
)
where P(A0) is the power set of A0.
Intuitively, in the old maximally cooperative equilibrium, everyone in COOP faced
expected punishment (conditional on playing an in-group player) of at least P ?. Those
who would cooperate in a maximally cooperative equilibrium after the change in group
composition would be those in the largest subset possible such that when all in the
subset in-group police, they face conditional probability of punishment at least as large
as P ?. To remain exactly as cooperative after the change in group composition, this
subset must comprise the same proportion of the new population as COOP comprised
of the old population. When such a subset comprises a larger proportion of the new
population, more cooperation is possible in equilibrium after population change; when
the set comprises a smaller proportion of the new population, less cooperation is pos-
sible in equilibrium.
The direction of change in cooperation following a change in population depends on
how the network structure changes. To generate hypotheses about the consequences
of population change, then, we need to make an additional assumption about how the
network structure changes with changes to the population. With a minimal behavioral
assumption about the formation of ties, we can make broad comparisons: assume
that forging network ties takes time, so that the longer an individual has been part
of a group, the more ties that individual has to other group members.15 Then two
hypotheses follow regarding certain instantiations of population change:
Hypothesis 5: Population increases that are especially rapid are likely to reduce co-
operation.
15This follows from the notion that social ties are the product of time spent together, frequency
of encounters, established trust, or shared experiences (Granovetter, 1973). We could make this
assumption more realistic by adding “on average” and then making the ensuing hypotheses prob-
abilistic, but the present statement is simpler.
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Hypothesis 6: Population change that is accompanied by high turnover– in which
long-time residents leave while new residents enter- is likely to reduce cooperation.
Given that social ties take time to forge, rapid population increases mean a large
proportion of a group’s network will occupy peripheral positions (at least for a while).
Similarly, high turnover means those with the least peripheral network positions are
those who leave the network and those with the most peripheral replace them. Both
strain cooperation.16
Finally, we can consider di↵erent patterns of population change chosen to be infor-
mative for the case that follows. Specifically, consider two stylized types of settlement
by individuals who immigrate into a group and comprise a small proportion of the
resulting group. In the first, the immigrants settle in a closed community, forging links
within the small, closed community but not with the existing members (“enclave”).
In the second, the immigrants settle throughout the community, forging links in a
dispersed manner with existing members (“integrated”). Then we can advance the
following additional hypotheses about settlement:
Hypothesis 7: Cooperation is more likely to break down in the presence of enclave
settlement than in the presence of integrated settlement.
Hypothesis 8: When the reach of individuals in the enclave is small relative to the
reach of individuals in the existing population, the existing population is likely to target
those in the enclave, resulting in mutual defect between the existing population and
members of the enclave.
16Others have observed that a shock to population can disrupt cooperation. Freudenburg (1986)
compares Colorado towns which have a relatively stable population to one which experiences a
dramatic population boom. The rapidly growing town featured both a sparser density of acquain-
tances and more crime. The argument presented here is that a rapidly changing population poses
dangers in two ways: first, new additions to a community may be relatively socially isolated and so
may have incentives to misbehave, and second, the larger population means each person needs to
sustain even more social contacts in order for the original members to continue cooperating. The
latter makes sense of a puzzling finding in Freudenburg (1986) that the newcomers are not the only
perpetrators of crime even though crime is more prevalent after they join the population.
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The intuition for these hypotheses relies on the fact that enclave settlements rela-
tively limit the reach of any immigrant in the network: at most he can reach others in
the enclave. In integrated settlement, on the other hand, the reach of any immigrant
is not limited to strictly the other immigrants and can be as large as the whole group.
Whether this means the enclave positions are more peripheral than the integrated ones
is not certain; however, if the original residents have lived together long enough, their
network will be relatively dense (by assumption). If the extent to which these new
positions are peripheral relative to the existing network is great, those in the existing
community have an incentive to defect against those in the enclave, knowing news of
these defections will not spread outside the enclave. The same incentive holds for all
members of the existing community, generating an incentive for the enclave to play d
in return in defense, and pushing the full group into a less-cooperative equilibrium.
Figures 2 and 3 depict a hypothetical original group with 187 members that faces
a 10% population increase with enclave settlement. Suppose that r = 2, T = 2, and
all members of the original group play as COOP . The original inhabitant on the far
right, depicted with the largest circle, is the most peripheral– messages sent by him
reach 62 others in rT = 4 steps. Due to the insularity of the enclave settlement and
their small size relative to the original inhabitants, the reach of anyone in the enclave
is constrained. In 4 steps, messages sent by anyone in the enclave reach everyone else
in the enclave – 18 people– and no others. This means the temptation to defect against
anyone in the enclave is much greater than the temptation to defect against a fellow
original inhabitant. When this temptation is too great, groups can find themselves in a
less cooperative equilibrium in which everyone defects against members of the enclave.
In the next section I present the case of boomtowns on the American western frontier
and assess support for the above hypotheses.
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Figure 2: Example group with 187 original inhabitants (right) and 19 new members who
settled in an enclave (left). News sent from the most peripheral original inhabitant (largest
circle on far right) reaches 62 others when r = 2, T = 2.
5 Boomtowns
5.1 Peer Enforcement on the Frontier
In 1848, the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill triggered a flood of migration to California
fueled by hopes of striking it rich. Over 300,000 prospectors moved to the region over
the two decades that followed. The rapid surge in population led to a phenomenon
known as the “boomtown,” in which a small, sparsely-populated mining camp became
a dense makeshift town with thousands of residents over a very short period of time.
These rapidly growing boomtowns were emerging in an otherwise weakly-governed
environment; the western American frontier in the mid 19th century is a textbook
example of a weak state setting. Formal governing institutions were largely absent and
weak when present. Federal and state law pertaining to mining and land rights was
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Figure 3: Example group with 187 original inhabitants (right) and 19 new members who
settled in an enclave (left). News sent from the most peripheral member of the enclave
(largest circle on left) reaches only 18 others when r = 2, T = 2. Enclave settlements limit
the reach of messages and so generate incentives to defect against members of the enclave.
barely existent in the area (Umbeck, 1977, p. 203), and settlers were far outside the
reach of the enforcement of laws related to personal safety, the security of personal
property, and day-to-day wellbeing (Clay and Wright, 2005, p. 159). Boomtowns had
especially weak governing institutions, in no small part because the growth of the towns
outpaced formal governance (and sometimes the construction of a jail). The code of
conduct and its enforcement was left to the residents of the boomtowns.
Despite the absence of formal governing institutions and the wealth of opportunities
to misbehave, mining towns on the frontier appear to have been remarkably peaceful
and secure. In his history of the mining communities and their governance composed
at the end of the 19th century, Shinn writes: “Scattered over a large territory, the
men of the various camps dwelt together in peace and good-fellowship, without any
26
representatives of the United States Government in their midst. Legal forms and
judiciary machinery were as nearly non-existent as it is possible to imagine in a civilized
country” (Shinn, 1884, p. 117). More recent histories of the frontier tend to begin by
noting that the so-called “wild west” was surprisingly cooperative and peaceful despite
the poor formal governing institutions (see, e.g., Prassel, 1972; Anderson and Hill,
2004). Some even point to metrics on which the western frontier rates as “a far more
civilized, more peaceful and safer place than American society is today” (Hollon and
Crowe, 1974, p.x). Stories circulated in the decades that followed the gold rush about
settlers leaving thousands of dollars’ worth of gold-dust in unguarded, unlocked tents
while they were away as evidence of how trusting and trustworthy the settlers were
(Shinn, 1884, p.150).
The historical record is rife with examples that point to a community enforcement
scheme at play: settlers in the boomtowns understood a set of actions to count as
violations and took it upon themselves to enforce good behavior, even to punish on
behalf of other settlers. Shinn notes: “Men had to settle their financial a↵airs and their
petty quarrels among themselves: that was the mining-camp doctrine” (Shinn, 1884, p.
126). Actions qualifying as o↵enses ranged from encroaching on mines– sluice-robbing
and claim-jumping– to personal violations like cheating in a business transaction and
committing violence.
Settlers monitored each other for cheating, which could be easy in the close living
spaces or increasingly crowded streams being mined (Umbeck, 1977, p. 214). For
instance, once miners had reached an understanding about who was entitled to mine
where, other miners would watch and protect someone’s claim in the expectation that
he would help do the same for theirs; when punishment was warranted, it was swift
(Umbeck, 1977, p. 216, 219). As another example, informal mining partnerships
became a salient part of working life and the whole community was involved in enforcing
relevant norms: “The legal contract of partnership, common in settled communities,
became, under these circumstances, the brother-like tie of “pard”-nership, sacred by
27
camp-custom, protected by camp-law; and its few infringements were treated as crimes
against every miner” (Shinn, 1884, p. 111).
In general, petty crimes and misbehavior were rare because the punishment, under-
stood to be communal, served as an e↵ective deterrent. Speaking optimistically about
the short-lived highly lucrative period of mining, Shinn explains: “Certainly it was
easier to earn money than to steal it, but it was infinitely safer also. In later days, for
a man to be caught sluice-robbing was to sign his own death-warrant” (Shinn, 1884, p.
119). While homicide was a rare punishment, there are also accounts of fines, beatings
and whippings doled out by the community in response to o↵enses (see, e.g. Umbeck,
1977). In the few places that quickly developed a periodical, sometimes it was used
to nudge the community to respond to particularly glaring cases of misbehavior: “in
those mining districts where legally constituted law enforcement agencies were either
ine↵ective or nonexistent, editors [of newspapers] encouraged the law-abiding popula-
tion to use extralegal means of quieting chronic lawbreakers and violators of the public
peace” (Halaas, 1981, p.85).
Settlers had to worry not only about interactions with fellow settlers living in the
fledgeling towns, but also with nearby Native Americans. What few interactions there
were between settlers and Native Americans occurred mostly in the land surrounding
the towns and, much more rarely, in the small commercial centers of the boomtowns
(Umbeck, 1977).17 There is no record of social relationships forging between the two
groups– from the perspective of the settlers, the Native Americans were the di cult-to-
individually-identify outgroup. There is record of agreements between the two groups
carving out acceptable and unacceptable behavior, sometimes promising payment in
17Few interactions between settlers in mining camps and Native Americans appear to have been
commercial; the bulk of interactions took place in the territory just outside of the mining camps
or on trails connecting mining camps to other towns. A rare instance of market interactions is
reported in Umbeck (1977, p. 211) in which Native Americans were hired to mine on Mormon
Island. Apparently settlers engaged in a variety of cheating schemes in these interactions: Native
Americans were o↵ered trade for other goods at exploitative rates, or were o↵ered a value of their
gold determined by faulty extra-heavy weights.
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exchange for rights to land and restricted hunting, grazing and burning (Umbeck, 1977,
p. 209), and sometimes laying out appropriate joint use of land (McGrath, 1987, p.
20). Once an agreement was understood or formally agreed to, settlers worked to keep
fellow settlers from violating the terms (McGrath, 1987, p. 49).
In short, settlers living in rapidly growing “boomtowns” during the gold rush of
the mid 19th century lived far from the reach of formal governance but appear to
have enforced good behavior via threats of community punishment. These threats
pertained to interactions with fellow settlers, and also with the rarer interactions with
neighboring Native Americans.
5.2 Out-group Cheating in the Mining Towns
Assuming that settlers in fact enforced good behavior via threats of community pun-
ishment by those who learned about o↵enses, if we knew the precise social structure
we could use the above results about network structure to o↵er individual-level expla-
nations across settlers and across whole towns. Unfortunately, although the American
western frontier is a uniquely well-documented weak state, the documentation is still
highly qualitative and imprecise. While there were more detailed records, these records
were on paper, and the quickly-constructed boomtowns were highly flammable: approx-
imately every mining town burned down at some point between its heyday and today,
destroying everything including their records (Umbeck, 1977, p. 216).
However, although we cannot map precise networks of communication among set-
tlers, we can infer rough network position from the accounts that remain and use this
to make coarser comparisons.
According to Hypotheses 1 and 2, when a shock makes defecting more profitable,
everyone’s incentive to commit the defection increases, but this increased incentive may
not be su cient to make everyone defect. The first for whom the incentive will encour-
age defection are the most peripheral in the network. While a complete log of behavior,
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especially in day-to-day interactions, is unavailable, qualitative accounts of behavior
between settlers and nearby Native Americans are suggestive of this relationship.
Boomtowns were constructed rapidly, and tended to feature a densely-populated
commercial strip surrounded by homesteads (sometimes tents) that became more sparsely
arranged with distance into the countryside (Mann, 1972, p. 502). The main oppor-
tunities for learning town gossip would have occurred along the commercial strip (in
the saloons and stores), in the mines, and among roommates (Mann, 1972, p. 486).18
Since people tended to mine where they lived and towns filled from the center out-
ward, channels of communication among miners were likely denser among the central
core than among those living in the outskirts.19 In other words, a reasonable infer-
ence is that settlers living in the outskirts were more peripheral to the mining town’s
communication network.
This process of settling first in a dense core and then the sparser outskirts could
be seen in Aurora, a classic boomtown located just across the modern-day Nevada
border which grew from a few prospectors to thousands of residents in the span of a
year (McGrath, 1987, p. 9). In the height of the boom, with 5,000 residents, “Aurora
was bursting at the seams. Every hotel, lodging house, and miner’s cabin was jam-
packed, and hundreds of people went without accommodations” (p. 9). The miners
quickly outstripped supplies, and nearby cattle ranchers capitalized on the new market
by driving cattle in and setting up ranches in the hills around the town (p. 17).
The settlers occupied a very dense town center which filled first; those arriving later
occupied a sparser set of ranches in the hills.
Of course, none of the land was actually previously unused, as the native Paiute
18People shared housing primarily with others whom they knew before entering the mining towns
(Mann, 1972, p. 487).
19While this is speculative and there could easily be exceptions, those in the geographic center
of a bustling community growing from the dense center outward naturally have greater access to
news of the day. If someone violated a norm of the mining town, they would have reasonably heard
soonest, especially compared to those living in the outskirts. This di↵erence would be even starker
if those in the outskirts arrived later to the village, after the center core was established.
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used the land for foraging and growing roots. To live a peaceful existence, settlers
then needed to cooperate both with fellow settlers and with the neighboring Paiute.
As the settler population grew larger, relations between Aurora settlers and the Paiute
grew tense. After some initial conflict between the white settlers and the Paiute, both
parties met and drew up an informal treaty to establish appropriate behavior and
promote inter-group peace (McGrath, 1987, p. 20). Both sides appear to have tried
to encourage fellow members of their groups to uphold their end of the agreement (p.
23, 40).
The winter following the treaty, of 1862-63, was especially severe and made the
resources shared by the two groups and governed by the informal treaty scarcer (p.
20). This shock made foraging on local plants and extending cattle grazing in violation
of the agreement more profitable to the settlers, and made hunting and gathering on
all parts of the territory in violation of the agreement more profitable to the Paiute.
According to the model presented above, we should expect greater incentives to violate
the treaty, and the first to act on those incentives to be the most peripheral.
Indeed, the first documented instance of inter-group conflict in violation of the
treaty was by a Paiute known as “Joaquin Jim.” Joaquin Jim is one of the very few
Paiute to enter the historical record by name specifically because he was known for
being an outcast among his people (McGrath, 1987, p. 21), suggestive of a peripheral
network position among the Paiute. Likewise, the first settlers to violate the inter-
group treaty were the more isolated ranchers living outside of the main core of town
instead of the more densely packed prospectors in town (p. 18).20
While this is only one account and the exact motives of any of the actors are
unknowable, the responses to a shock that increases the benefits to defection, ↵, among
20All settlers, not merely ranchers living in the outskirts, would have had incentives to forage
for plants and violate the agreement. Also of note is that violence persisted as a string of isolated
incidents through the fall and winter of 1863. Small-scale conflict can be durable, even if not
permanent. Joaquin Jim acquired a band of followers who “remained at large and continued to
prey on the unsuspecting traveler or prospector” (p. 40). The rarity with which they experienced
punishment allowed this partially-cooperative equilibrium to persist.
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those engaged in community enforcement are consistent with the results of the model
above.
5.3 The Strains of Population Change
Boomtowns followed a similar trajectory in the middle of the nineteenth century. As
already discussed, their populations grew rapidly, especially in the first few years follow-
ing 1848. Populations were on net rising despite the fact that many early prospectors
left shortly after arriving, generating substantial turnover (Mann, 1972, p. 493). The
first wave of population influx was predominantly from elsewhere in the United States
(Mann, 1972, p. 490).
About a decade after the initial gold rush took o↵, two changes occurred throughout
western mining towns. First, the number and proportion of foreign miners substantially
increased. For instance, in 1850, Grass Valley and Nevada City had almost no foreign-
born miners; by 1860, about 20% of the population was Irish, 22% was British, and
there were also significant proportions of Chinese, German and French miners (Mann,
1972, p. 496). In 1850 there were under 1,000 Chinese people living in California; by
1860 there were almost 35,000 and by 1870, almost 50,000 (DuFault, 1959, p. 155).
Second, the relative peace and harmonious living miners had enjoyed in the 1850s was
noticeably unraveling (Mann, 1972, p. 497).
Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that rapid population change with high turnover pose
problems for cooperation. Hypotheses 4, 7 and 8 establish expectations for the tar-
gets of misbehavior: shocks generate incentives for groups to target a few, the most
peripheral, and never cooperate with them.
Initially, reception of all foreign miners was positive or neutral, but attitudes toward
some turned strongly negative and hostile; this was particularly the case for attitudes
toward the Chinese (DuFault, 1959, p. 155). Early historical accounts blame the
character of the foreign miners (Shinn, 1884, p. 144); later accounts attribute increased
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conflict to the fear of lost jobs and an inability to understand the foreigners (DuFault,
1959, p. 157). However, records do not corroborate a jobs-taking explanation. In
fact, the Cornish appear to have consistently taken the best jobs, and yet did not face
anything like the level of hostility directed at the Chinese (Mann, 1972, p. 500).21
Examples of conflict between the Chinese and American settlers abound, especially
o↵enses perpetrated by the Americans against the Chinese, ranging from ignored mur-
ders to repeated robbery to denied services (DuFault, 1959, p. 158). In stark contrast
with the early neutral reception, many mining camps transformed into places with
rampant anti-Chinese sentiment and activity, and many eventually sought to expel the
Chinese miners. Putting the issue harshly, the Daily Free Press printed in February
1880: “We reflect the sentiment of a large majority of the citizens of this coast when
we say that we have no desire to see the Chinese ill-used or badly-treated in any way,
but they are a curse to the people of the coast, and we do not want them here. They
do not and cannot assimilate with Americans...” (McGrath, 1987, p.137).
Why did conflict surge in mining towns in the 1860s, and why was the treatment of
Chinese settlers substantially worse than the treatment of other non-American settlers?
One important di↵erence existed between Chinese and other non-American settlers:
the Chinese consistently carved out separate communities within mining towns while
other foreign settlers dispersed throughout the towns (Shinn, 1884; DuFault, 1959;
Mann, 1972; McGrath, 1987). The Chinese settlers did interact with the American
settlers in the towns and in the mines, but did so without forging social relationships;
they lived segregated from the rest of camp (DuFault, 1959, p. 158).
From all accounts, the Chinese settled in highly insular enclaves within mining
towns. Carving out separate living areas and maintaining separate habits resulted in
few American settlers forging relationships with them, a separation exacerbated by
21Mann (1972, p. 497) writes that “The arrival of other ethnic groups did not result in such
an outcry [compared to the Chinese], in part because the largest group among them, the Cornish,
possessed skills needed for the general prosperity of the mines and towns.” It is hard to believe
their skills are all that exempted the Cornish from the hostility faced by the Chinese.
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the language barrier in the many instances where the Chinese settlers did not speak
English (McGrath, 1987, p. 124, 140). However, despite the absence of relationships
that would result in embeddedness in the town’s social network, the two groups did
interact in daily life regularly. Mining towns tended to have a single option for basic
services like stores, hospitals, stage line o ces, and banks (though many options for
saloons) at which all would interact (McGrath, 1987, p. 109). Working the same
streams and mines would also generate opportunities to interact, and the Chinese
areas of more developed mining towns tended to host highly popular opium dens of
which many settlers partook (McGrath, 1987, p. 126). In other words, the Chinese
settlers interacted with the other settlers without forging relationships outside of the
small enclave.
One interpretation is: existing settlers began in their quite cooperative equilib-
rium. However, the restricted reach of the Chinese settlers’ network positions limited
the extent to which they could report misbehavior committed by other settlers. Under-
standing this, the existing settlers had an incentive to mistreat the Chinese since they
expected to face limited repercussions. Facing increasing mistreatment, the Chinese
defected in response to mitigate the consequences, and the group found itself ratcheted
into a less cooperative equilibrium in which all settlers e↵ectively ostracized the Chi-
nese settlers in accordance with Hypotheses 3, 7 and 8. Other waves of migration into
the boomtowns saw integrated rather than enclave settlement, resulting in greater em-
beddedness in the existing settlers’ networks, a wider potential reach of gossip, and the
absence of these incentives to ostracize. In those cases, a more cooperative equilibrium
could persist.
Of course this is simply an interpretation consistent with the hypotheses and not
a causally identified inference. The historical record does not allow ruling out every
possible alternative explanation of the trajectory of cooperation breakdown. What
we can say is that enclave settlement with few social ties to existing settlers and
high levels of interaction generates both incentives to defect against the enclave and
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pressure to transition to a less cooperative equilibrium with ostracism. Settlement
patterns in boomtowns would have made this incentive present in the case of Chinese
and not other immigrants. The limited historical record precludes concluding that this
incentive dominated other factors and caused mistreatment of the Chinese, though
does admit this as a possibility.
6 Conclusion
Informal governance can keep neighboring groups cooperating internally and with each
other, even when news about behavior spreads from person to person through social
networks. Sometimes, though, due either to natural constraints or shocks to a strategic
environment, the best a group can do is enforce less-than-full cooperation, tolerating
some persistent cheaters along the way.
The trajectory of self-governance in the boomtowns on the American western fron-
tier demonstrate this point well. In the early days, despite the limited formal governing
institutions, settlers were quite successful at enforcing cooperation among their peers,
and even cooperation with an out-group of Native Americans, many of whom remained
strangers. The gossip mill churned, people expected to face great penalties doled out
painfully by their peers if peers were to learn about misbehavior, and so life proceeded
relatively peacefully.
Environmental shocks, rapid population growth, high turnover, and variance in
settlement patterns administered shocks that strained groups’ ability to enforce coop-
eration. Strains tend to ratchet a group into a less cooperative equilibrium in which
the most peripheral become uncooperative (and perhaps ostracized in perpetuity). The
Chinese immigrants to mining camps fared especial poorly, perhaps due to a pattern
of settlement that resisted integration into social networks; established settlers faced
new incentives to defect, specifically against the Chinese, since the reach of gossip they
could spread to trigger punishment was highly limited. Consequently, cooperation
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deteriorated, especially among the Chinese and existing settlers.
While the results of the model presented here are consistent with the recorded
history of 19th century boomtowns, the insights are about self-governance more gen-
erally. The extent to which news can spread widely and quickly through a community
has consequences for peer-enforced cooperation, with particularly high stakes in weak
state contexts. While a new and growing research tradition aims to measure commu-
nication networks among real groups of people, there is much more to learn about the
empirical spread of information and informal enforcement of behavior.
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